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TRIAL COURT DISCRETION IN CONDUCTING
THE VOIR DIRE SUBJECTED TO MORE
STRINGENT SCRUTINY:
CORDERO V. UNITED
STA TES
The custom of subjecting potential jurors to an extensive and searching
voir dire examination' has become virtually nonexistent in both the crimi-
nal and civil jury trial process in many areas of the United States.2 This
trend is presently accepted in the Superior Court for the District of Colum-
bia3 as well as in other judicial systems throughout the country. In most
instances, judicial economy and a desire to assure speedy trials have
placed the juror voir dire examination at the lowest level of priority in a
trial.' In addition, many legal scholars have noted that, in reality, there is
1. The French term voir dire, literally translates "to speak the truth." Within the con-
text of trial practice, the phrase voir dire is used to denote the oral examination of prospec-
tive witnesses or jurors conducted by the court or by the attorneys for the litigating parties.
The voir dire is conducted to provide an opportunity for objections to, inter alia, compe-
tency, conflicting interests, or prejudicial beliefs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979).
2. While the voir dire examination is an integral part of both civil and criminal jury
trials, this Note focuses only on its use within the criminal context.
3. The District of Columbia Superior Court, as well as other courts throughout the
nation, has conducted voir dire examinations as little more than a summary proceeding
primarily because of the tremendous backlog of cases in the court system. See generally
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT SYSTEM STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE D.C. BAR, REPORT OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT SYSTEM STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA BAR TO THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Comm. Print 1983).
As a result, in those courts that use summary voir dire proceeding, only blatant prejudices
and biases are brought to light. Their illumination facilitates the proper exercise of peremp-
tory challenges and for cause challenges but allows little opportunity to delve into the realm
of deep-seated prejudices which, in some situations, are critical to the trial's outcome. How-
ever, the prevailing attitude among trial lawyers and judges alike is that "voir dire should
generally be restricted to pertinent and proper questions designed to test the fairness, capac-
ity and competency of the prospective jurors." Jordan, A Trial Judge's Observations About
Voir Dire Examinations, 30 DEF. L.J. 223, 228 (1981).
4. In many, if not most cases, voir dire is "conducted in a somewhat perfunctory, hur-
ried fashion. This desire for speed often results in a haphazard, incomplete, and unsatisfac-
tory voir dire examination." See Jordan, supra note 3, at 223. Nevertheless, the Criminal
Rules of the Superior Court for the District of Columbia mandate a thorough voir dire
examination. Rule 24(a) provides in relevant part:
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no functional screening process that occurs in selecting a jury. Rather, the
litigating parties reject or accept potential jurors with the hope that the
best panel will emerge.5 Thus, many practitioners and judges question the
validity of the voir dire process as it exists within the present trial system.
In criminal cases, the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the accused the right to trial by an impartial jury.6 The United
States Supreme Court has noted many times that the sixth amendment
right to an impartial jury is inextricably intertwined with the right to chal-
lenge a potential juror.7 In several notable cases,8 the Court has stressed
the importance of a meaningful voir dire of prospective jurors in ascertain-
ing the effect of biases upon a trial's outcome.9 To achieve such a result,
(a) Examination. The Court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the
prosecutor to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct
the examination. In the latter event the Court shall permit the defendant or his
attorney and the prosecutor to supplement the examination by such further inquiry
as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional
questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper ....
In addition, Rule 24(b) sets out the number of peremptory challenges allowed in criminal
cases. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges. In felonies, each
side has 10, while in misdemeanors, the rule provides for 3. There is no limit on the number
of challenges for cause allowed in criminal trials. Counsel need only demonstrate a reason
why a particular person should not serve on the jury.
5. Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors.- Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into
Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 525, 528 (1977); but see Comment, Racial Bias and the Right
to an Impartial Jury- A Standardfor Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 961
(1981) (the author endorses the voir dire examination as a tool for assuring the emergence of
an impartial jury, which in turn will guarantee a fair and reasonable analysis of the evidence
and a just determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence).
6. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
"[Iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
.... U.S. CONST. amend VI.
7. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (the right to an impartial jury carries a corresponding respon-
sibility to assure that the necessary means are utilized to impanel such a jury); see also Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209-22 (1965) (discussing the jury challenge as a coefficient of the
right to trial by a fair and impartial jury).
8. See, e.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931); Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396 (1894); see also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). In Aldridge,
the Court reversed the murder conviction of a black defendant because a federal trial judge
had refused to allow the defense attorney to question prospective jurors regarding racial
prejudice during voir dire, thereby precluding a meaningful juror examination. 283 U.S. at
314-15.
9. As Justice Marshall noted in Ham, the Court frequently has reiterated its belief in
providing criminal defendants with the opportunity to prove bias on the part of a potential
juror. 409 U.S. at 532-33 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Demon-
stration of bias facilitates the removal of potential jurors through challenges for cause. Jus-
tice Marshall also pointed out that traditionally, the Court has considered the right to
challenge potential jurors as one of the most significant rights accorded an accused. See
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the voir dire examination should be conducted in a manner which will
minimize the effect of juror bias.' ° In practice, however, jury selection
very often results not in the exclusion of those jurors exhibiting prejudice,
but rather, in the inclusion of a jury panel possessing a wide range of
prejudices." The voir dire examination cannot eliminate all biases and
prejudices. Therefore, when conducting a voir dire, an attorney's goal
should be to minimize the influence of bias by selecting a jury panel with a
balanced representation of conflicting biases reflective of a cross section of
the population in a particular area.' 2
The jury selection process is further complicated by the trial judge's in-
fluence during the voir dire. A trial judge may exercise his discretionary
power during the voir dire by one of two methods.' 3 The judge can con-
trol the scope of the voir dire questioning by limiting the number and con-
tent of questions posed by counsel for both sides. Alternatively, the judge
may conduct the voir dire examination himself, limiting the role of counsel
to the submission of questions for the veniremen which the judge may or
may not utilize.
In criminal proceedings before the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia, the voir dire is governed by Superior Court Criminal Rule 24.
generally id for an historical overview of Court decisions in this area; see also Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950); Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950). In both
Dennis and Morford, the defendants wished to elicit information from prospective jurors
regarding their political connections. Those cases were brought during the "McCarthy era,"
at a time when government employees were required to abide by loyalty orders. Thus, dur-
ing voir dire, the defendants sought to determine whether certain prospective jurors could
offer impartial verdicts when they were employees of or affiliated with the federal govern-
ment. In Dennis, the desired questions were permitted during the voir dire; in Morford, the
questions were not permitted. 339 U.S. at 165, 259. The Court upheld the conviction in
Dennis, but not in Morford, stating that the opportunity to prove actual bias is inextricably
bound with a defendant's right to an impartial jury. Id. at 171-72, 259.
10. Gaba, supra note 5, at 528. Gaba noted that the questions posed to prospective
jurors have a three-fold purpose: first, to determine if potential jurors meet statutory qualifi-
cations to serve; second, to elicit biases that would enable challenges for cause; third, to
provide the necessary information to make a reasonable utilization of peremptory chal-
lenges. Id at 531.
11. See generally Comment, supra note 5. Although the voir dire examination is an
imperfect mechanism, when utilized thoroughly and properly, it furthers the goal of select-
ing an impartial jury panel. ld at 959.
12. See Gaba, supra note 5, at 528. Gaba also noted that as a practical matter, most
practitioners believe that an extensive voir dire examination is not justified economically.
No matter how well it is conducted, the voir dire examination will always be time consum-
ing and ineffective in achieving the goals for which it was designed. Id at 532-33; see also
Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire. An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 916, 940-44, 955-56 (1971); Craig, Erickson, Friesen & Maxwell, Voir Dire. Criticism
and Comment, 47 DEN. L.J. 465, 480 (1970).
13. Gaba, supra note 5, at 531.
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The rule provides that the court has the discretion to allow defense and
prosecution attorneys to conduct the voir dire. An alternate method under
Rule 24 allows the trial judge to examine prospective jurors. ' 4
The scope of the trial judge's discretion in the voir dire process was re-
cently considered by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Cordero
v. United States.5 As the result of a disruptive political protest,' 6 defend-
ant Cordero was convicted of violating sections of the District of Columbia
Code which regulate personal conduct in the United States Capitol build-
ing or the Capitol grounds.' 7 At the commencement of trial, Cordero's
counsel submitted thirty-eight questions for the voir dire, which were re-
jected by the trial court.' 8 The proposed questions were designed to probe
14. See supra note 4. Rule 24(a) allows either a defendant or his attorney and the prose-
cutor to conduct the examination of the veniremen, or, in the alternative, the trial judge may
conduct the voir dire. However, the rule suggests that a thorough and searching examina-
tion should take place, even allowing supplemental examination of prospective jurors by
counsel where the judge has conducted the juror examination.
15. 456 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1983).
16. Cordero shouted political statements from the Senate gallery. He also threw politi-
cally oriented leaflets into the air. Id. at 839-40.
17. Cordero was convicted of violating sections 9-123(4) and 9-124 of the District of
Columbia Code. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 9-123(b)(4), -124 (1973) (recodified as D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-112(b)(4), 9-113 (1981)). Section 9-123(b)(4) provided:
Unlawful conduct on Capitol Grounds or in buildings
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons willfully and know-
ingly-
(4) to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language, or to engage in any disor-
derly or disruptive conduct, at any place upon the United States Capitol grounds
or within any of the Capitol buildings with intent to impede, disrupt, or disturb the
orderly conduct within any such building or any hearing before, or any delibera-
tions of, any committee or subcommittee or the Congress or either House thereof.
Section 9-124 provided:
Parades or assemblages and displays forbidden in Capitol grounds.
It is forbidden to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in said
United States Capitol grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device
designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or move-
ment, except as hereinafter provided in sections 9-128 and 9-129.
18. The questions which Cordero requested and upon which his appeal was based are
presented in relevant part as follows:
20. The evidence in this case will show that Mr. Cordero is either a member of
or a supporter of an organization known as Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
(d) How many of you have heard or read about the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War?
(3) [Hlow would this affect your ability to sit on this case . . .
21. (g) [Appellant] is accused of throwing leaflets into the Senate Gallery
and making a speech which in essence denounced the United States and other
countries for planning World War 11. How many of you would characterize
1124 [Vol. 33:1121
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attitudes of the veniremen toward persons who denounced the United
States or who were members of political groups generally considered by
most American citizens to be revolutionary or radical in nature.' 9 Rather
than posing these questions, the trial judge proceeded to conduct a sum-
mary and general voir dire examination.2 °
The central issue in Cordero was whether the voir dire examination
should be designed to question jurors about, or at least alert jurors to, the
political issues involved in a case in which the juror's political attitudes
could affect their perceptions of the accused's involvement in a particular
crime.2' Cordero argued that the failure of the trial judge to alert the ve-
niremen to potentially sensitive political issues prevented them from deter-
mining whether as jurors, they could act in a fair and impartial manner in
considering the charges brought against Cordero.22 He claimed that his
sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial trial by jury had thereby
been infringed 23 because politically biased jurors could not be identifed
and challenged for cause.
This Note discusses the impact of Cordero v. United States upon the voir
dire process in the District of Columbia. After delineating the previous
standard employed by the District of Columbia courts in evaluating the
constitutional adequacy of the jury selection process, this Note will iden-
tify the stricter standard as set forth by the Cordero court. Finally, the
Note will conclude that the stringent Cordero standard results in a more
just and careful jury selection process, thereby guaranteeing the presence
of fair and impartial tribunals in criminal cases.
your own feelings as being in complete disagreement with those expressed in
[appellant's] speech?. . . [H]aving those feelings, would it be difficult for you
to be completely fair and impartial in sitting as a juror in this case?
24. Have you read or heard anything about other protest activities of the
Vietnam Veterans Against the War of [sic] the Revolutionary Communist
Party[?] If so, would anything you have heard or read come into play in your
consideration of this case?
32. Have any of you or any close friends, family members or associates
ever been a member of any organization which has as one of its objectives
opposition to Communism?
Cordero, 456 A.2d at 843-44.
19. Id at 839.
20. Id
21. Id at 838-39.
22. Id. at 841, 845. Cordero asserted that not only had the trial judge improperly ques-
tioned the jurors, but that he had also failed to outline at the beginning of the voir dire the
facts surrounding Cordero's alleged offense.
23. Id at 841-42.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF STRICTER VOIR DIRE STANDARDS
The effect of juror prejudice on the outcome of a trial has long been the
subject of analysis by trial attorneys and trial judges alike.24 Since the
emergence of prejudice of the type highlighted in Cordero, courts have
struggled with the impact of juror prejudice on trial outcome. The extent
to which a court must probe potential jurors' biases and attitudes through
particularized questioning prior to jury selection has been the subject of
much controversy. The areas most often discussed as potentially problem-
atic in juror attitudes and thus, appropriate for definitive and specific ques-
tioning, have included race, morality, religion, and nationality.25 The
Supreme Court decisions of the past decade concerning the constitutional
requirement to provide a fair and impartial trial for an accused criminal
defendant have defined the parameters of a judge's duty in assessing po-
tential jurors.26 The duty has been defined through a narrowing of the
scope of the trial judge's discretion as it relates to the conduct of the voir
dire examination.27
In Ham v. South Carolina,28 a black civil rights worker was convicted by
a state court of drug trafficking. He argued on appeal that his sixth
amendment right to a fair trial was violated because the trial court failed
to examine potential jurors concerning possible racial prejudice.29 The
Supreme Court agreed with Ham and held that the trial judge's refusal to
probe potential jurors concerning potential racial prejudice constituted re-
versible error.3" Such refusal denied Ham his sixth amendment right to
trial by a fair and impartial jury.3 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehn-
24. See, e.g., Johnson, Voir Dire in The Criminal Case: A Primer, TRIAL, Oct. 1983, at
61-65.
25. See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (necessity of inquiring into
racial attitudes of potential jurors); Kuzniak v. Taylor Supply Co., 471 F.2d 702 (6th Cir.
1972) (importance of determining juror attitudes about certain national or ethnic groups);
Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958) (failure to inquire
regarding religious bias or prejudice of veniremen constituted reversible error).
26. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
27. The trial court's discretion traditionally has been limited by the "essential demands
of fairness." Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 310.
28. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
29. Id
30. Id at 527-28. The Court rejected the idea that veniremen should be questioned on
their attitudes about facial hair, which the defendant had also argued as grounds for revers-
ible error. Id at 528.
31. Id. at 527; see supra note 6 for text of the relevant portion of the sixth amendment.
Because the case had originated at the state level, the Ham Court couched its holding in the
due process language of the fourteenth and not the sixth amendment. The sixth amendment
right to a fair trial was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment due
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quist acknowledged the broad discretion of the trial court regarding the
questions asked during the voir dire. However, the Court required that, at
a minimum, the trial judge make a broad inquiry of the panel in order to
elicit the racial prejudices of potential jurors.3 2
In 1976, the Supreme Court limited Ham's reach. In Ristaino v. Ross,33
a black defendant was convicted of violent crimes against a white security
guard. Although the trial judge questioned the jury panel generally about
bias and prejudice, he did not address exactly the issue of racial
prejudice.34 On appeal, Ristaino argued that Ham mandated that venire-
men be questioned specifically regarding racial prejudice. The Court dis-
missed Ristaino's appeal, reasoning that the case was factually
distinguishable from Ham.35 Noting that the constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury does not always require particular questions to be posed
during the voir dire,36 the Court concluded that specific examination re-
garding racial prejudices is necessary only when "special circumstances"
are present.37 In so holding, the Ristaino Court limited Ham to its particu-
lar facts.38
The Court next considered the voir dire issue within the context of in-
quiries concerning prejudices against individuals of particular national ori-
gin. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States,39 a defendant of Mexican descent
requested a question during the voir dire designed to elicit any potential
juror prejudices against Mexicans. The trial judge, while refusing to spe-
cifically inquire about prejudice against Mexicans, did ask the prospective
jury a general question about prejudices against aliens.40 After being con-
victed of smuggling illegal aliens into the country, Rosales-Lopez appealed
on the basis that this general inquiry made by the trial judge was not suffi-
cient to enable identification of jurors holding prejudices against Mexi-
process clause through the use of selective incorporation. See generally Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
32. Ham, 409 U.S. at 527. Although the Court acknowledged that the South Carolina
legislature had enacted a statutory scheme for the selection of juries, the Court nevertheless
thought that essential fairness and due process dictated that, under the facts of Ham, the voir
dire questions regarding racial prejudice were necessary and proper. Id
33. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
34. Id. at 591-93. The trial judge denied Ristaino's motion that a question specifically
directed to elicit racial prejudice be asked during the voir dire.
35. Id at 594-95, 598.
36. Id at 594 (citation omitted).
37. See generally id at 595-97. In Ham, the defendant was a civil rights worker. Pre-
sumably, the special circumstances of his political and occupational leanings coupled with
his race required a particular inquiry into racial prejudice of the potential jurors.
38. Id at 596-97.
39. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
40. Id. at 185-86, 193.
19841 1127
Catholic University Law Review
cans. He argued that this limited inquiry prevented his counsel from
challenging jurors for cause.' In affirming, the Court pointed to the trial
judge's determination that a juror's prejudice toward aliens might affect
the fair and impartial nature of the jury decisionmaking process. 2 The
Supreme Court noted that the trial judge had inquired during the voir dire
regarding the attitudes of prospective jurors toward aliens in general. The
judge, in fact, had removed two jurors for cause based upon their re-
spoinses to the broad question concerning alienage and nationality.43 The
Court stressed that the trial judge had excluded successfully those jurors
whose presence would result in a circumvention of the sixth amendment
guarantee of a fair and impartial trial." As a result, the Court held that
there was no reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice had
tainted the jury's deliberations.45
Justice Stevens dissented. 6 Although acknowledging that the voir dire
examination was adequate to determine a general prejudice against aliens,
he nevertheless maintained that as a matter of law, the voir dire was inade-
quate to elicit particular prejudices against Mexican-Americans. 7 Justice
Stevens emphasized that in order for there to be a fair trial, the jury must
be impartial.48 Thus, he stressed that effective inquiry into a juror's poten-
tial bias is absolutely essential before that juror is permitted to judge the
41. See id. at 187. Counsel for Rosales-Lopez requested that a specific question regard-
ing prejudice toward Mexican-Americans be asked. The trial judge, both prior to the com-
mencement of the voir dire and at its completion, denied this request. Id. at 185-86.
42. Id. at 193.
43. Id. Although affirming Rosales-Lopez's conviction, the Court took judicial notice
of the critical importance of the voir dire in preserving a defendant's sixth amendment right
to an impartial jury. Id at 188.
44. See id. at 193. The Court noted that "[t]here can be no doubt that the jurors would
have understood a question about aliens to at least include Mexican aliens." Id
45. Id. at 194. Because the trial judge had questioned the veniremen about prejudice
toward aliens in general, the plurality felt that any possible prejudice toward Mexicans had
been taken into consideration in the voir dire process. Id at 193. Further, the Court consid-
ered the "special circumstances" rule as set forth in Ham and Ristaino, and rejected its appli-
cation to Rosales-Lopez. Id at 189-92; see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
46. 451 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.).
47. Id. at 202. Justice Stevens stated that the voir dire was inadequate as it ignored the
fact that the defendant was a Mexican-American being tried in the Southern District of
California, where a large number of Mexican-Americans reside. Therefore, Justice Stevens
saw an inherent possibility of irrational prejudice against Mexican-Americans, particularly
due to the existence of local animosity toward Mexican-Americans. Id
48. Id at 196. The dissent suggested that there are two distinct categories of bias that
should be identified in potential jurors. First, there may be a bias arising from the particular
facts of the case. Second, there may be a special prejudice against an individual. The dis-
sent stressed the importance of determining whether either type of bias exists to assure the
accused's right to a fair trial. Id. at 196, 202.
1128 [Vol. 33:1121
Voir Dire
actions of another.49
The standard of appellate review applied in the District of Columbia for
evaluating a trial judge's exercise of discretion in conducting the voir dire
examination traditionally has been the "substantial prejudice" test as
enunciated in Khaa/is v. United States.5" Khaalis involved the occupation
by Hanafi Muslims of three buildings in the District of Columbia. The
various defendants were convicted in the District of Columbia Superior
Court of murder, kidnapping, assault, and conspiracy.51 They appealed
the convictions on several grounds, including the manner in which the voir
dire examination was conducted.5" In scrutinizing the voir dire process as
it transpired in Khaalis, the appellate court reiterated the established rule
in the District of Columbia that the trial court has broad discretion in its
conduct of the voir dire. That rule has provided that absent a clear abuse
of discretion by the trial judge and substantial prejudice to the accused, the
actions of the trial court should be affirmed. 53
II. THE CORDERO STANDARD: STRICTER SCRUTINY OF
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATIONS
A. A Farewell to Perfunctory Voir Dire in Criminal Cases
Although the Supreme Court has scrutinized the voir dire process and
its relationship to the sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial jury
trial over the past decade, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had
no occasion to reevaluate its voir dire standard as enunciated in Khaalis.54
49. Id at 196.
50. 408 A.2d 313 (D.C. 1979). The "substantial prejudice" test provides that absent an
obvious abuse of discretion by the trial judge accompanied by substantial prejudice to the
accused, the trial court decision will be upheld. Id at 335.
51. Id at 319. Although the jury found the defendants each guilty of multiple offenses,
each defendant was also acquitted on a number of charges. Id. at 319 n.2.
52. Id at 344.
53. Id at 335; see also infra note 54. For a general examination of the broad scope of
trial court discretion, see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015 (D.C. 1978); Davis v. United
States, 315 A.2d 157 (D.C. 1974); Harvin v. United States, 297 A.2d 774 (D.C. 1972).
54. Although both the Cordero majority and dissent referred only to Khaalis, the test of
determining whether the voir dire examination meets the essential demands of fairness had
been set forth previously by the courts of the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Coleman v.
United States, 379 A.2d 951, 954 (D.C. 1977). The test of essential fairness was first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1931). A-
dridge's "essential fairness" test provided that when the right to question a potential juror
during the voir dire examination is infringed upon, and such infringement results in unfair-
ness to the defendant, the trial court has committed reversible error. Id The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has employed this test to evaluate the
fairness of the voir dire. See generally United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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In Cordero v. United States, however, the court was faced with the consid-
eration of that very standard." Specifically, the court determined the ap-
propriate test for evaluating the fairness of the voir dire examination
within the context of criminal proceedings.
In Cordero, the trial judge proceeded through a general voir dire exami-
nation of the jury panel that was devoid of any questions designed to elicit
possible political prejudices.56 As a part of the voir dire process, the trial
judge also summarily apprised the jury of the circumstances of the case,
describing the defendant's offenses generally as disorderly conduct.57 In
contrast, the trial presentation of Cordero's offenses, and of his political
affiliations, was much more vivid. The prosecution questioned at length
an officer of the Capitol police force who had observed the occurrence that
led to Cordero's arrest. In addition, the politically radical leaflet that Cor-
dero allegedly had thrown about in the Senate gallery was introduced into
evidence.5" Cordero was found guilty of disrupting Congress and sen-
tenced to thirty days' imprisonment and fined $300.59
On appeal, Cordero charged that his sixth amendment rights had been
violated because the voir dire examination had not been designed to elicit
the political prejudices of potential jurors in a case which turned largely on
political issues.6" The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed
holding that the voir dire examination had been unfair. While acknowl-
edging that the trial court conducted the voir dire pursuant to the proce-
dural provisions of Superior Court Criminal Rule 24,61 the appellate court
nevertheless found that the judge had violated the spirit of the sixth
55. 456 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1983).
56. The voir dire examination consisted of the following questions:
(1) whether any of the potential jurors had heard or read about the incident; (2)
whether the jurors were familiar with either of the attorneys, the defendant, or the
witnesses; (3) whether any of the prospective jurors or their close relations had ever
been charged with disturbing the peace or a similar offense; (4) whether any of the
veniremen or their close relations were engaged in law enforcement as an occupa-
tion at the present time or in the past; (5) whether any members of the jury panel
felt they would accord greater or lesser weight to testimony of someone who was a
law enforcement officer because of their position; (6) whether any of the veniremen
had ever served on a grand jury; (7) whether any members of the prospective jury
panel had any legal training; and (8) whether a potential juror felt he or she could
not render a fair and impartial verdict in the case.
Cordero, 456 A.2d at 839.
57. Id.
58. Id at 840.
59. Id
60. Id at 841.
61. See supra note 4.
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amendment through his methodology in conducting the examination. 62
The Cordero court emphasized that in denying the questions specifically
requested by Cordero's counsel, the trial court ignored the very real possi-
bility that Cordero's political views and associations could trigger strong
feelings on the part of potential jurors.63 Although the trial court need not
have framed the questions exactly as Cordero's counsel had requested,64
the appellate court found that the lower court had abused its discretion in
failing to incorporate the substance of those questions into the voir dire
examination.6 The court held that if substantial prejudice to the accused's
rights has occurred, the standard of essential fairness cannot be met. 66 It
thereby refined the Khaa/is test of substantial prejudice,67 establishing in-
stead a standard of essential fairness to the defendant.
.8 The Ramications of Cordero
In espousing the spirit of the recent Supreme Court decisions concerning
voir dire, the Cordero court moved even closer toward establishing a new
judicial framework within which to evaluate the propriety of the juror ex-
amination. In essence, the court provided criminal defendants with a jury
that was not merely a representative sampling of the general population,
but one that was carefully screened for inherent juror prejudices that could
damage a defendant's chance for a fair hearing. Therefore, Cordero more
closely parallels Justice Stevens' dissent in Rosales-Lopez68 than the major-
ity decisions of the Supreme Court in Ham, Ristaino, or Rosales-Lopez.
The appellate court cautioned the trial judges to examine carefully and
meticulously the prospective jury panel in criminal cases in order to avoid
reversals of convictions that could occur due to infringement of a defen-
dant's right to a fair and impartial jury.
In establishing a standard of essential fairness, the Cordero court consid-
ered not only the voir dire questions which were asked, but also the gen-
eral charge to the jury panel that preceded them. At trial, the judge
initially informed the prospective jurors about the nature of the offense in
62. See Cordero, 456 A.2d at 841.
63. Id. at 844.
64. Id at 844 n. 14. Even when it is necessary for a trial judge to question a prospective
jury panel regarding a particular matter, the trial judge generally retains the discretion to
frame the questions in an appropriate fashion. Thus, it is the information elicited which is
of importance and not the form of the question.
65. Id. at 844-45.
66. Id. at 845.
67. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
1984] 1131
Catholic University Law Review
an oblique way.6 9 This introduction to the case, coupled with the inade-
quacy of the voir dire questions, was insufficient to elicit adequate infor-
mation about the actual prejudicial beliefs of the prospective jury so that
the defense could exercise intelligent challenges.7" Further, the veniremen
had no way of knowing whether they would be biased in this case, thereby
enabling them to disqualify themselves.7 Thus the totality of the circum-
stances rendered the standard voir dire examination ineffective to ensure a
fair jury trial. In conducting such an examination, the trial judge commit-
ted an abuse of discretion which constituted reversible error.
72
In a terse dissent, Associate Judge Kern likened Cordero's objections to
other "fabled defenses of gall."7 3 Because Cordero himself had introduced
information at trial regarding his political views and affiliations, Judge
Kern found the appeal to be particularly ironic." Furthermore, he noted
that under the circumstances, Cordero did not suffer "substantial
prejudice," the only judicial grounds in the District of Columbia for invali-
dating the trial judge's actions.75
69. See Cordero, 456 A.2d at 844-45.
70. See generally Cordero, 456 A.2d at 844-45.
71. A question frequently asked during voir dire is whether any potential juror feels
that there is any reason why he or she would not be able to fairly and impartially decide the
case at hand. A potential juror who answers in the affirmative essentially disqualifies him-
self from hearing that particular case. See generally Note, Selection of Jurors by Voir Dire
Examination and Challenge, 58 YALE L.J. 638 (1949).
72. 456 A.2d at 845. The court determined that the trial judge committed an abuse of
discretion because he did not tailor the voir dire examination to fit the circumstances of the
particular case. Id The reversal of a trial court under these circumstances is significant.
The scope of voir dire has been traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, al-
though there have been reversals. See supra note 25. For a general discussion of trial court
discretion and its shortcomings, see Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to
Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493 (1975).
73. 456 A.2d at 845-46 (Kern, J., dissenting). Judge Kern noted that the basis for Cor-
dero's appeal was as outrageous as one posited by the proverbial "child who murdered his
parents and then sought mercy on the ground he was an orphan." Id at 846. Although
providing a dramatic analogy, his dissent sidesteps the importance of a proper voir dire
examination to the outcome of a criminal trial such as Cordero. Because Cordero's unortho-
dox political views were so interwoven with the facts of the case, it is difficult to understand
Judge Kern's failure to recognize the importance of eliciting the jurors' political prejudices
during the voir dire examination.
74. _Id For example, Cordero testified as to the nature of his combat duty in Vietnam,
as well as to his post-war political activities with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Id
at 946-47.
75. Id at 847. See generally Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313 (1980). Judge Kern
intimated that the new standard announced in Cordero was a repetition of the standard
announced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the so-called
"Yippie" trials. For a discussion of that standard, see United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Judge Kern criticized Cordero's new test of "essential fairness. '"76 In his
view, the new test did not require the appellant to prove that he suffered
substantial prejudice, but instead requires the government to demonstrate
that the voir dire examination has adequately identified and eliminated
any possible juror prejudices toward the defendant.77 Notably absent in
Judge Kern's dissent, however, is an analysis of the real meaning of the
sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. While he dissented
because he found no basis for a shift from the "substantial prejudice" stan-
dard, Judge Kern failed to emphasize that the constitutional right to a fair
and impartial jury is paramount in all evaluations of the propriety of the
voir dire. The Cordero dissent, therefore, arguably reflects a mere surface
consideration of the facts peculiar to Cordero's case.78
In Cordero, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals developed a
more workable test for evaluating jury selection in criminal proceedings.
The new test focuses on fairness to the accused, contrasting sharply with
the previous standard of evaluating acceptable levels of unfairness or
prejudice in jury selection. This shift in emphasis has broad implications.
Trial courts no longer will have unfettered discretion in determining what
should or should not be included in the voir dire examination. More sig-
nificantly, the courts no longer will be free to conduct a summary voir dire
in order to shorten the trial process.
The Cordero standard, however, may result in some adverse conse-
quences. For example, the restrictions on trial court discretion may result
in longer voir dire examinations, which ultimately may not enhance the
quality of the jury selection process at all. Additionally, some may be crit-
ical of the more searching examination, fearing that judicial economy will
fall by the wayside due to an extended voir dire process.7 9 However, the
underlying consideration of essential fairness addressed by the Cordero
court will inevitably result in a fairer jury selection process that comports
more fully with the mandates of the sixth amendment. Subjecting the trial
76. Cordero, 456 A.2d at 847.
77. Id.
78. Judge Kern's cursory consideration may be explained by the minor nature of the
alleged violations in Cordero.
79. The major objections voiced by practitioners to a more extensive voir dire is that it
would further increase the amount of time and money spent on court proceedings, which
many view as currently excessive. See Gaba, supra note 5, at 532. Additionally, there is no
general sense among practitioners that the voir dire process actually produces its intended
effect. "Perhaps there would be greater consensus that time should be spent on voir dire if
there were some assurance as to the usefulness of the procedure." Id It is conceivable that
if voir dire examinations were tailored more specifically to the facts of particular cases, the
result would be more satisfying.
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judge's discretion in conducting the voir dire to a more stringent level of
scrutiny will foster more thoughtful and effective examinations of prospec-
tive jurors.8 0
Rather than usurping the trial judge's function, the stricter test as set
forth in Cordero can and should enhance his decisionmaking.8 ' In order
to comply with the Cordero test, the trial judge must examine prospective
jurors more fully with regard to potential areas of prejudice. Recognizing
that perfunctory examination of potential jurors is no longer permissible,
the trial judge will focus more directly on identifying those persons whose
background or interests would seriously impair a criminal defendant's
right to a fair and impartial jury trial.
It is possible that Cordero could result in greater use of attorney-con-
ducted voir dire examinations. Although in the past the trial judges have
preferred to conduct the voir dire themselves in order to streamline the
jury selection process, the fact remains that, under Rule 24, attorneys are
allowed to question the veniremen.82 Greater attorney involvement may
prove beneficial to the court system because the attorney knows well the
facts and issues of the immediate case. Counsel may particularize the voir
dire inquiries accordingly. There is, however, a danger that some attor-
neys may utilize a longer voir dire in order to prolong trials. Nevertheless,
it is unlikely that attorneys would prepare a lengthy voir dire examination
except in cases in which potential juror prejudices could result in unfair-
ness to the accused.
80. See supra note 56 for an overview of the questions asked by the trial judge in Cor-
dero. The questions were broadly based and, with the exception of the question designed to
determine if any potential jurors had ever been convicted of disturbing the peace, could
have been used in a civil trial as well. The absence of particular questions involving polit-
ical prejudices was the determining factor in the reversal.
81. For a general discussion of benefits and drawbacks inherent in setting standards for
trial judges in the voir dire process, see Note, supra note 72, at 1510-15 (setting forth explicit
guidelines for the juror examination process). The Court may fear that an establishment of
such guidelines would upset the delicate federal-state balance. Since different cases have
divergent requirements, the Court may be reticent to specify rigid guidelines for the voir dire
process. Id. at 1512. Additionally, the Court may be hesitant to prescribe certain questions
designed to satisfy all psychological theories regarding bias. Id at 1513. Finally, the Court
has probably avoided the announcement of rigid specifications for conducting the voir dire
due to increased court congestion and the obvious need to expedite trials. Id On the other
hand, factors which favor the establishment of universal voir dire standards include the fact
that the voir dire is often perfunctory, thereby not serving its intended purpose. Because the
examination is unregulated, the voir dire is sometimes misused by counsel. Id. at 1514.
Minimum standards would seem to be appropriate in order to provide some type of uni-
formity in the jury selection process.
82. See supra note 4.
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III. CONCLUSION
In Cordero v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
established an essential fairness standard for evaluating jury selection in
criminal proceedings. This stricter standard foreshadows a positive change
in the jury selection process. Attorneys and judges alike will be more con-
scious during the voir dire to elicit prejudicial information from the venire-
men. Inquiries into likely areas of prejudice will be tailored more
carefully to the facts of the case. Although the trial judge's discretion may
be subjected to greater scrutiny, Cordero will nonetheless serve to enhance
the jury selection process by mandating a concerted effort on the part of
trial judges to assure selection of fair and impartial jurors. A more effec-
tive voir dire in the impanelling of juries for criminal trials will safeguard
the accused's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.
Bevery Petersen Jennison

